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CENTRAL

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
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DAILY BRIEF



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USSR - Communist China: Moscow's desire to bring the Sino-Soviet dispute into the open is further indicated by open attacks on the Chinese by name made recently by Western European Communist parties. Apparently in response to Soviet guidance, Belgian party politburo member Terfve, in an article on 21 January in an Austrian Communist newspaper attacked the speech of the Chinese delegate to the World Peace Council meeting in December. Terfve stressed that Chinese views continue to deviate from Moscow's, despite "patient efforts made within the Communist movement for months." On 25 January, a pro-Communist newspaper in Rome carried excerpts from Italian Communist Luigi Longo's speech at the Moscow congress of Communist parties in November 1960 in which he criticized the Chinese by name for "spreading confusion, doubt, and uncertainty in the international movement."

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[redacted] one reason for publicizing portions of Longo's speech--and other documents from the November 1960 congress--is to prepare a party position for a possible diplomatic break between Moscow and Peiping.

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Peiping may be conditioning Chinese opinion for an even-
tual break.

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Students in
Peiping University are reported to have expressed the view
last month that China must not exclude the possibility of a
diplomatic rupture with Moscow.

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Mongolia: [Mongolia's eagerness to establish diplomatic relations with the US and "as many other non-Communist countries as possible" was reiterated by two members of Ulan Bator's mission to the UN in a conversation with an American UN official on 30 January. Mongolian officials last summer expressed disappointment at the failure to secure US recognition.]

[One of the Mongolian spokesmen at the UN intimated that the problem of his country's isolation was compounded by the pressures of living between the USSR and Communist China. He said relations with Communist China had deteriorated somewhat as a result of Ulan Bator's support for Moscow on the Albanian issue. Mongolia alone of the Asian satellites has strongly supported the USSR on this issue and has criticized the Chinese Communist position in the controversy]

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

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On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.

BERLIN: Communist military activity and recent Soviet actions in the immediate Berlin area do not suggest that the Communists expect to risk military confrontation over Berlin in the immediate future.

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SOUTH VIETNAM: Although counteractions by government forces have recently shown some success, the Viet Cong continues its high rate of subversive and small-scale military activity and retains its capability to conduct large-scale attacks on preselected targets in some areas of the country at any time.

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